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Abstract
Lying and ction both involve the deliberate production of statements that
fail to obey Grice’s rst Maxim of Quality (“do not say what you believe
to be false”). The question thus arises if we can provide a uniform analysis
for ction and lies. In this chapter I discuss the similarities, but also some
fundamental dierences between lying and ction. I argue that there’s lit-
tle hope for a satisfying account within a traditional truth conditional se-
mantic framework. Rather than immediately moving to a fully pragmatic
analysis involving distinct speech acts of ction-making and lying, I will
rst explore how far we get with the assumption that both are simply as-
sertions, analyzed in a Stalnakerian framework, i.e. as proposals to update
the common ground.
1 Fiction and lies
Lies and ctional statements1 share an important characteristic that sets them
apart from more pedestrian forms of communication: what they express is false,
or rather, believed by the author to be false. When I utter (1a) I know this can’t
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I thank the editor and two anonymous referees for valuable feedback on the rst draft. I thank
Andreas Stokke for helpful discussion and feedback. This research is supported by NWO Vidi
Grant 276-80-004.
1What I call ctional statements here includes statements taken directly from a work of c-
tion, e.g. the actual opening lines of Lord of The Rings, as well as statements like (1a) that are
not lifted word-for-word from some canonical work of ction, but nonetheless describe events
or facts holding in some ctional world, i.e. they express things that are true in the ction.
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literally be true, because Frodo, Sam, and Mount Doom are all made up, they
never existed. Similarly, when I say (1b) to impress my colleagues at lunch, I am
well aware that what I’m saying is false.
(1) a. Sam carried Frodo from Mount Doom.
b. I read Sein und Zeit last week.
Assuming that, as their surface form suggests, lies and ctional statements are
simply instances of the speech act of assertion, we get that they are assertions
of propositions believed to be false by the author. In section 3 I discuss some
renements of the traditional notion of assertion needed to work out this simple,
uniform account.
Despite this crucial similarity, I want to highlight in the remainder of this
section some essential dierences between ction and lies. A rst, salient prima
facie dierence concerns the intended eects on the addressee. When I said (1b)
I wanted to deceive my addressee: I knew that I did not read Sein und Zeit, yet I
wanted my audience to believe that I did. The whole point of lying seems to be
to create such an asymmetry between speaker’s and hearer’s belief. By contrast,
when you read Tolkien’s work, or listen to me talk about it, there is no deception
– in fact, the ctionality of the statements is presumed common knowledge in
these cases. Whatever the intended eect of my utterance of (1a) is exactly, it is
not that you come to believe stu about hobbits that I don’t believe.
We can bring out this dierence in Gricean terms as follows.2 If we analyze
both lying and ction as assertions, they would both constitute violations of the
Maxim of Quality. In the case of lying, the violation is necessarily covert, which
explains why no implicatures are generated. But in the case of ction the viola-
tion is overt – every reader is aware that dragons or hobbits don’t exist. Since
overt violations normally trigger implicatures (e.g. leading to ironic, metaphor-
ical, or otherwise non-literal interpretations), it seems that upholding the claim
that ction involves assertion will require some careful maneuvering. We return
to this task in section 4.
The seemingly clear distinction that emerges from the discussion above is
somewhat blurred again by cases of so-called bald-faced lies, i.e. lies that do not
involve deception. Carson’s (2006) famous example involves a witness who, for
fear of repercussions, testies in court that he did not see a certain criminal com-
mit a certain crime, knowing full well that the jury has just seen video evidence
2Thanks to Andreas Stokke for pointing out this angle. Cf. Stokke (2016) for details on the
relation between lying and the Maxim of Quality.
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that puts him at the scene. The witness knows he’s not going to convince anyone
that he didn’t see the crime. His assertions is therefore not meant to deceive the
members of the jury that he’s addressing, but to demonstrate to relevant mem-
bers of the criminal organization that he’s no snitch. If we want to count the
witness as lying, then deception cannot be a dening dierence between ction
and lying.3
A clearer dierence between ctional statements like (1a) and lies like (1b) is
the fact that although (1b) is just plain false, many philosophers have argued that
(1a) is not really false, or even that it is in some sense true – e.g., true relative to
The Lord of the Rings saga, or ctionally true. If your high school English teacher
discusses Tolkien’s writings and asks who carried Frodo from Mount Doom, the
only right answer will be Sam. To bring out this intuition of ctional truth con-
sider also the negation of (1a), Sam did not carry Frodo, which is quite clearly false.
In sum, while neither ction nor lies are intended as expressing facts about the
real world, in many contexts we’re inclined to count some ctional statements
as true (Harry Potter is a wizard), or at least ctionally true, or more true than
some others (Sherlock Holmes is a hobbit).
Another dierence between ction and lies that has received a lot of atten-
tion, this time from the side of philosophy of art and ction, is known as the
paradox of (the emotional response to) ction (Radford, 1975). The paradox starts
from the observation that we can be moved by stories – whether fact or ction.
For instance, when I meet you in bar and tell you in some detail about my dog
Hector dying after he saves a child from a burning house, you may be moved to
tears. When I then proceed to tell you that in fact I never had a dog, that I made
the whole thing up, your sadness will quickly evaporate (and make way for anger
or embarrassment, perhaps). Yet, as Radford puts it, we weep for Anna Karenina,
even though we know quite well, even in advance, that Tolstoy’s novel is a c-
tion and Anna Karenina never existed. Somehow, ction allows us to “suspend
disbelief” and be emotionally engaged with known falsehoods. Lies, according
to Radford, lack this property: once it comes out that the lie is a lie, suspension
of disbelief and emotional engagement in accordance with the story’s content
become impossible.4
Summing up, at rst sight lies and ction seem rather similar, with bald-faced
3Unless we say that bald-faced lies aren’t really lies (Meibauer, 2014), or are in fact deceptive
(Meibauer, 2016). Cf. chapter 19 “Bald-faced lies” in this handbook.
4It would follow that one cannot be emotionally engaged (in accordance with the content of
the lie) with a bald-faced lie at all, since by denition it is common ground at the outset that such
a lie is a lie.
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lies straddling the divide. On closer inspection, we nd important dierences.
Only ction has the peculiar property that it generates ‘ctional truths’, whose
known literal falsity, with respect to the real world, does not hinder emotional
involvement or judgments of truth. I conclude that, despite initial similarities,
ction and lies are distinct phenomena.5 Still, rather than just dening two new
primitive speech act types, in addition to assertions, commands, etc., it is worth
investigating if we can specify a linguistic framework to describe both their sim-
ilarities and dierences, to each other and to factual assertions.
2 A semantic analysis of ction and lies?
When we’re trying to characterize the nature of ction and lies, it is fairly obvious
that syntax will not help us much. Depending on the context, a single sentence,
say (2) (based on the above illustration of Radford’s paradox of ction), can be
an instance of a truthful assertion, a lie, or part of a ctional narrative.6
(2) Hector ran into the burning house
Since the peculiarities of lies and ction seem intimately related to semantic no-
tions like truth and falsity, we might want to turn to semantics next. In this sec-
tion I discuss whether semantics, more specically formal, or truth-conditional
semantics (as opposed to cognitive semantics, cf. Fauconnier 1994), indeed con-
stitutes the right level of analysis. The answer will be negative.
2.1 Truth conditional semantics
Semantics starts from the idea that knowing the meaning of a sentence consists
in knowing its truth conditions. In order to count as knowing the meaning of
‘methane is poisonous’ I don’t need to know whether methane is in fact poi-
sonous, but I’d need to know what kind of states of aairs would make the sen-
tence true. In terms of possible worlds, a familiar tool from modal logic: when
presented with an arbitrary (complete description of a) possible world, I need to
be able, in principle, to gure out whether in that world the sentence is true or
5See the chapter “Lying and the Arts” in this handbook for more on the history of the debate
about the relationship between lying and ction.
6This is not to say that there are no syntactic dierences whatsoever between ctional and
non-ctional assertions, for instance. It may well be that certain syntactic constructions (‘once
upon a time’, free indirect discourse) are characteristic of ction.
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false. This epistemological idea is cashed out semantically by equating sentence
meaning with truth conditions, and then often further equating a sentence’s truth
conditions with the set of worlds that make it true, also known as the proposition
expressed by the sentence.
At this point let me dispel a common confusion about the use of the term
‘possible world’ in formal semantics, as opposed to its use in literary studies.
When talking about ction we often talk more or less informally7 about ‘c-
tional worlds’, like ‘the world of Harry Potter’. However, in the context of formal
semantics, there is no single possible world ofHarry Potter. Rather, like individual
sentences, the Harry Potter books express propositions, and hence correspond
to sets of worlds. Thus, we can talk about ‘the worlds of Harry Potter’, which –
to a rst approximation, see 4.2 below – are all possible worlds compatible with
all the information written in the books. Since, the books don’t mention, say,
the exact time of Dumbledore’s birth, this set will include possible worlds where
Dumbledore was born at noon, worlds where he was born at 12:34, at 17:30, etc..
Back to the task at hand. Truth-conditional semantics is ill-suited to distin-
guish between fact, ction, and lies. Take our ambiguous example (2). The truth
conditions of this sentence will correspond to the set of worlds in which there
was a point in time before the utterance time where some Hector ran into some
contextually salient burning house. This proposition is expressed independently
of whether or not the sentence is intended or assumed to be true, false, or c-
tionally true. The aim of semantics is to specify a systematic theory that derives
truth conditions (in the form of possible worlds propositions) from the syntactic
structure of sentences and the lexical meanings of the words in it. What speaker
and hearer do with this set of worlds once it’s derived is not part of the semantics
proper. That is, whether the actual world is believed to be among those worlds,
or whether the proposition is intended to update the hearer’s beliefs, or to con-
strain her imagination, and/or to trigger some action or emotional response – all
of this falls outside the scope of semantics proper and belongs to pragmatics.
2.2 Empty names and the limits of semantics
As a matter of fact, not only does semantics fail to usefully distinguish between
ction, lies, and factual assertions, it fails to even assign any meaning to some
typical instances of lying and ction (including (2)). Frege (1892), arguably the
founder of modern semantics, already noted that the use of empty names in c-
7Cf. Werth’s (1999) Text World Theory for a formal version of this usage.
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tional statements could cause trouble. He considers the following ctional state-
ment:
(3) Odysseus was set ashore in Ithaca while fast asleep.
Since Odysseus never existed, the name Odysseus has no reference. By the prin-
ciple of compositionality (roughly, the reference of a statement depends on the
references of its constituents – a principle constitutive of most forms of truth-
conditional semantics), it follows that the statement as whole has no reference.
This is problematic for semantic systems that equate meaning with reference.
Frege solves the problem of empty names by invoking the notion of Sinn
(‘sense’) as a separate level of meaning. Although Odysseus has no reference, it
does have a Sinn, a mode of presentation, so the sentence as a whole can have
a well-dened meaning at the level of Sinn. However, Kripke (1980) has since
convincingly argued that proper names do not actually have a Sinn, they just
refer directly to the individual that bears the name. If Kripke is right, (3) can’t
have either a truth value or a Sinn. Since lies and ction are natural habitats for
empty names, cf. the name Hector for my made up dog in (2), they pose severe
challenges for semantics.8
I conclude that traditional, truth-conditional semantics is the wrong place to
look for an informative analysis of ction. Even if we can somehow get around
the problems surrounding empty names, symptomatic of ction and lies, we’re
not likely to capture the dierence between uses of (2) as a lie, a sincere asser-
tion, or a ctional statement merely in terms of truth conditions or propositions
expressed. It follows that we’ll have to turn to pragmatics – what do we do with
the meanings that syntax and semantics give us?
3 The pragmatics of lying
Pragmatics, the study of how humans use language to communicate, is a vast,
heterogeneous eld. In this chapter I want to stay close to the semantic side of
pragmatics. More precisely, I’ll stick with the well-known analysis of the seman-
tics/pragmatics interface pioneered by Robert Stalnaker Stalnaker (1970, 1978).
8Sure enough, logicians and philosophers of language have devised many work-arounds to
solve the puzzle of empty names, like using ‘free logics’, giving up direct reference for some or
all names, or enriching our ontology with non-existent entities. See, for instance, Braun (2005)
or Sainsbury (2005) and references therein.
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In this section I introduce Stalnaker’s framework and present Stokke’s (2013)
application of it to lying.
3.1 Assertion as common ground update
In brief, on Stalnaker’s analysis what we do with assertions is to update the com-
mon ground, where the common ground is the shared body of information that
the speaker and hearer take for granted. On the one hand, the common ground
is useful for modeling linguistic context dependence. Speaker and hearer rely
on the common ground to choose ecient modes of expression, such as pro-
nouns, names, and indexicals, to refer to salient entities already established in
the common ground (rather than just using descriptions that uniquely identify
their referents independent of context). On the other hand, the common ground
is in turn aected by what is said. Every time a speaker makes an assertion (and
no one objects) its informational content becomes part of the evolving common
ground.
Stalnaker works out this general picture of context dependence and con-
text change in a traditional possible worlds semantics. In the following I’ll skip
over the context dependence part (i.e., the theory of presupposition satisfaction
Beaver & Geurts 2011) and focus on context change, i.e. the way assertions shape
the common ground. First of all, the common ground at each point in time is a
set of possible worlds – roughly, the worlds compatible with the shared beliefs
of speaker and hearer, or, put dierently, the information that the speaker and
hearer together take for granted. Statements express propositions,9 which are
likewise modeled as sets of worlds. The central denition of Stalnaker’s prag-
matics says that updating a common ground C with an assertion of proposition
p means removing all non-p worlds from C . Let me illustrate this with an exam-
ple.
I’m talking to you over the phone. We start with a common groundC0 where
we both know for instance that my name is Emar, that the Earth is round, that
we’re both academics etc, but let’s say you don’t know where I am calling from.
C0 then contains worlds where I’m in Groningen on February 22, 2017, and
worlds where I’m in Göttingen, Leiden, Nijmegen, etc..C0 does not contain worlds
where the Earth is at, or I’m on Jupiter. Then I say, “I’m at a conference in Lei-
den”, thereby expressing the proposition that Emar is at a conference in Leiden
9The context-dependence part that we skipped over would add that statements only express
propositions if their presuppositions are satised by the common ground in which they occur
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on February 22, 2017. UpdatingC0 with this information means we remove from
C0 all the worlds where I am not in Leiden at that time. The result will be a new
common ground,C1, which is more informative in the sense that it excludes some
possibilities that were not yet excluded before my announcement.C1 then serves
as background for the interpretation of the next utterance, which will again re-
move some worlds, and thereby become more informative, and so on.
There are a number of renements of this basic propositional update idea
that feature prominently in recent debates. The rst is that updating the com-
mon ground is not something that the speaker can accomplish single-handedly.
As Stalnaker (2002) himself stresses, all that the speaker can realistically do is
propose an update.10 The proposal only becomes an actual update once it’s ac-
cepted by all interlocutors. In a totally cooperative discourse, perhaps acceptance
may be the default, i.e. proposals automatically become updates unless someone
objects. But when we move to less ideal situations, involving potentially menda-
cious speakers, it becomes essential to distinguish proposal and update, so that
we can model a hearer’s rejection of a proposed update. I won’t pursue this is-
sue further here (cf. Asher & Lascarides 2013 on dealing with non-cooperative
discourse).
The second renement relevant to the current endeavor concerns the exact
denition of the common ground. Typically, the common ground is thought of as
common knowledge or common belief, notions that are well-studied in epistemic
logic (Fagin et al., 1995). A proposition p is a common belief among a group of
agents i all agents believe that p, all agents believe that all agents believe that p,
all agents believe that all agents believe etc. The common ground in a two per-
son conversation is then the intersection of all propositions that are commonly
believed by speaker and hearer. We’ll see below that lying and ction necessitate
further renement of this notion.
3.2 Lying, acceptance, and the common ground
Now that we have an analysis of the speech act of assertion, the question arises
if we can perhaps apply it to lying and ction. In the remainder of this section I
present Stokke’s (2013) analysis of lying within Stalnaker’s pragmatic framework
of assertion.
The null hypothesis is that lying is a form of asserting, viz. asserting some-
10This insight is part and parcel of more negrained discourse models developed on the basis
of Stalnaker’s (e.g., Roberts 2012; Farkas & Bruce 2009).
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thing one believes to be false. In Stalnakerian terms, a lie is a proposal to update
the common ground with a proposition that one believes to be false. On our re-
construction of the notion of common ground in terms of common beliefs this
is a non-starter. If the speaker’s proposal to add p to the common ground is suc-
cessful, p will be commonly believed, so then both she and the hearer believe p.
But surely, telling a successful lie shouldn’t aect the speaker’s belief that p is
false.
As Stokke observes, some of Stalnaker’s more cautious remarks about the
notion of common ground oer a potential solution. Stalnaker observes that
when we communicate successfully we don’t always believe what our interlocu-
tor says. In some cases, my disbelief will be grounds for an objection, thereby
blocking the information growth in our common ground. But in other cases, I
might want to just go along, perhaps just to see where my interlocutor is going,
or out of politeness or fear. In such cases we’d be interpreting the discourse just
like we would otherwise, by accepting the propositions expressed, and modifying
the common ground accordingly, following the usual rules of presupposition sat-
isfaction and information update. If indeed we want to model such cases as cases
of genuine communication and common ground update, we have to weaken our
denition of common ground as common belief. Stalnaker proposes to dene the
common ground in terms of an attitude of ‘acceptance for the purpose of conver-
sation’, which he further characterizes by saying that “to accept a proposition is
to treat it as a true proposition in one way or another – to ignore, for the moment
at least, the possibility that it is false.” (Stalnaker 1984:79). Stokke then extracts
the following precise acceptance-based denition from Stalnaker 2002: a propo-
sition p is common ground i both speaker and hearer accept p, and believe that
they accept p, and believe that they believe that they accept p, etc, (more com-
pactly: common ground is common knowledge of universal acceptance).
With this weakened notion of common ground we can now maintain our
null hypothesis, viz. that lying is simply the assertion of some proposition that
the speaker believes to be false. By uttering the lie, the speaker indicates that
she herself accepts its truth – in the Stalnakerian sense of ‘treating it as true’
– and wants the hearer to do the same. Neither interlocutor needs to believe
what was said, either before or after the assertion, but by accepting it, both are
able to continue interpreting subsequent sentences in the usual way. Both would
become committed to treating it as if it were true, at least temporarily, for the
purposes of the current conversation.
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4 The pragmatics of ction
Following the reasoning above, we run into the same problems when we treat
ction as assertion in a belief-based common ground model. The successful as-
sertion of Frodo is a hobbit should not lead to an updated common ground that
entails that speaker and hearer believe in the existence of hobbits. We should
be able to interpret a ctional statement without either hearer or speaker being
committed to believing it to be true. In 4.1 – 4.3 I explore how to adapt the basic
Stalnakerian common ground conception so as to circumvent problems with c-
tional assertions. In 4.4 I sketch some more radical pragmatic proposals that go
beyond common ground updating and involve notions like pretense and imagi-
nation.
4.1 Fiction and the common ground
Sainsbury (2011), like Stokke also crediting some remarks from Stalnaker, argues
that the key to making sense of ction is to replace belief with acceptance. So-
called ctional truths, like Harry Potter lived under the stairs are true relative to
the acceptance of the content of the Harry Potter novels. When we read these
novels we choose to accept – but probably not believe – what the ction tells us,
thereby constructing an ever more informative common ground of shared accep-
tance between writer and reader who each treat the Harry Potter propositions
as true, exactly as in other forms of assertion.
One of the problems with this approach is that it doesn’t separate a ction-
based common ground from other, truth-oriented common grounds. For instance,
J.K. Rowling and I both know that the Earth is round, humans are mortal, brooms
don’t y, and wizards don’t exist. This type of information will be part of our
common ground in any communicative exchange between us. But then how can
we maintain consistency in our common ground when I start adding the propo-
sitions that make up Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone? And in the other di-
rection, when we have somehow updated the common ground with all the in-
formation from these novels, how come we can still condently and sincerely
assert that Harry Potter is a ctional character and wizards don’t exist? Some-
how, we need to keep the ctional common ground separate from other common
grounds.
Eckardt (2014) takes the idea of quarantining the ctional common ground as
the core of her semantics of narrative discourse. When I pick up my rst Harry
Potter book, I start a fresh common ground in which to keep track of just what’s
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going on in the Harry Potter universe. When I close the book and talk to J.K.
Rowling about the weather I somehow close the ctional common ground and
start (or continue) updating a more realistic common ground, one in which we
both accept that wizards don’t exist, among other things. In this discussion of
lying, Stokke (2013) explores a similar idea: ctional statements function like as-
sumptions in mathematical proofs or philosophical thought experiments in that
they are used to create a temporary “unocal” common ground. A crucial dif-
ference between ction and lying is then that a lie is a proposal to update the
ocial common ground, while a ctional statement is a proposal to update or
create an unocal common ground.11
4.2 Importingworld knowledge intoctional commongrounds
However the isolation of ctional or unocial common grounds is formalized,
total isolation is too strong. If we start our ctional common ground from scratch
we eectively sever all ties with the world as we know it. When in our reading we
then encounter a name like ‘France’ or ‘Napoleon’ we might accept that there are
entities by these names,12 and continue updating the ctional common ground
with information about those. But this way we can never account for the obvious
fact that the author is referring to France – a large European country, capital
Paris, populated by French-speaking people – and Napoleon, the 19th century
French Emperor. Can we really say that I understood War and Peace if I failed to
connect it to any familiar historical facts, people and places? And, more generally,
how much are we even going to be able to understand of any novel if we start
with a tabula rasa and can’t assume even some basic principles of physics and
human nature.
Theories of ction interpretation thus look for a middle ground: we need to
separate ctional common grounds from non-ctional ones, but we still want to
have access to at least some basic world-knowledge when constructing ctional
common grounds. For instance, when I rst picked up War and Peace I automati-
11As an anonymous referee points out, lies and ctions can also be iterated and embedded in
each other. This shouldn’t cause any trouble here: if we’re reading about a ctional character
lying to another ctional character we’re creating (or updating) an unocial/ctional common
ground containing the information that the two characters are having a conversation and thereby
updating the ocial common ground between them. A special case of lying in ction is that of
the so-called unreliable narrator, cf. Zipfel (2011).
12By a process that Lewis (1979) has called accommodation of the presuppositions triggered
by the use of these names.
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cally included in the new ctional common ground the information that humans
breathe oxygen, the earth is round, and Napolean was that French Emperor who
failed to conquer Russia – I did not need the book to explicitly inform me of
these facts. Although not directly formulated in terms of common grounds and
updates, Lewis’s (1978) inuential ‘Truth in Fiction’ is the locus classicus for this
issue. For Lewis, roughly, a statement is true in a ction i it is true in those
worlds compatible with the text that are maximally close to the actual world (or,
more precisely, to the author’s overtly expressed beliefs about the actual world).
In eect, knowledge of the actual world thus enters into our representation of a
ctional world, unless the text explicitly contradicts it. Applied to our example,
when constructing a possible worlds representation of War and Peace we might
be led to include worlds where Napoleon utters certain phrases we know he in
fact did not utter, but we exclude outlandish possible worlds where gravitational
acceleration at sea-level is 11m/s2 or Napoleon secretly has a robotic arm grafted
on by aliens, even though the text itself doesn’t explicitly exclude these possi-
bilities. See Bonomi & Zucchi (2003) for an adaptation of Lewis’s ideas into the
Stalnakerian framework.
4.3 . . . and the other way around
Arguably, there is also a kind of knowledge transfer in the opposite direction,
from the ctional to the non-ctional domain. We’ve seen how reading Sherlock
Holmes stories leads to a ctional common ground in which there is a esh and
blood detective named Sherlock. But when I’m no longer consuming or otherwise
engaging with the ction directly, I can still talk about the ctional people and
events described in it.
(4) a. Sherlock is just a ctional character, invented by Conan Doyle. He
never really existed.
b. I prefer the BBC’s Sherlock, played by Benedict Cumberbatch, to Co-
nan Doyle’s original character.
Such so-called metactional statements can be literally true (but not ctionally
true, because in the novels Sherlock is not ctional but real). I may sincerely as-
sert these statements and thereby express facts about the actual world, i.e. pro-
pose to update the ocial common ground between me and my interlocutor.
This suggests that, while the ctional, or unocial, common ground contains a
real-life Sherlock, the ocial common ground contains a corresponding ctional
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entity, that serves as the referent of the name Sherlock in (4). The ontological and
semantic issues raised by such talk about ctional characters is a topic of much
philosophical debate, which I can’t go into here (cf., e.g. Zalta 1983; Kripke 2011;
Thomasson 1999; Walton 1990; Friend 2007).
Another case of information owing from the ctional to the non-ctional
domain involves the observation that reading literary ction oers us not just
an entertaining glimpse of a dierent world, but also contributes to our under-
standing of the actual world, the ‘human condition’, applicable in real-life.13 For
an exploration of this idea, exploiting the tools of possible worlds semantics, I
refer to Bauer & Beck (2014).
4.4 More radical pragmatic accounts of ction
I end by sketching a more radical pragmatic approach to ction interpretation,
one where we let go of the assumption that a work of ction can be understood
as a series of assertions, in the sense of proposing to update the common ground.
A large subclass of such pragmatic approaches is sometimes grouped together as
‘pretense theories’. There are two main avors. First, according to Searle (1975)
or Kripke (2011) a typical ctional statement is not an assertion but a ‘pretend
assertion’ – Tolkien and his readers merely pretend to refer to Frodo, whom they
pretend to exist. Second, according to Walton (1990) or Currie (1990) we’re deal-
ing with a sui generis speech act type. Since the latter approach is highly inu-
ential – at least in contemporary philosophy14 – let me end this section, and this
chapter, with a brief sketch.
In the terminology of Walton, assertions are prescriptions for the hearer to
believe. By asserting that chlorine is dangerous, I intend for you to believe that it
is. Note that this is really just a simplied version of the Stalnakerian denition
above in which by asserting something I propose to make it common ground. In
the same traditional terminology, Walton then characterizes ctional statements
as prescriptions for the reader to imagine. The intended eect of reading a c-
tional text, say, is not that I believe the text to be true or common ground (ocial
or unocial); it is that I engage in a certain type of act of imagining. In this char-
acterization, imagination is typically thought of as an individual, psychological
13The relationship between ction and literature is a thorny issue that I can’t go into here. Cf.
e.g. Hempfer (2004).
14Narratologists meanwhile have developed dierent ‘radical pragmatic accounts’, like e.g.
Walsh’s (2007) rethorical approach, which is inspired by Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson,
1986).
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attitude, rather than a shared group attitude, as in the Stalnakerian framework for
assertion. Fiction interpretation thus lends itself to a more ne-grained type of
semantic/pragmatic analysis where we consider the eects of interpretation on
the complex mental states of individual speech act participants rather than just
lump everything together in a single, intersubjective common ground. See Maier
(2017) for a formal semantic proposal along these lines, and García-Carpintero
(2015) for a more Stalnakerian analysis in terms of shared commitments.
5 Conclusion
Lies and ctional statements are similar in that neither obeys Grice’s rst Maxim
of Quality: do not say that which you believe to be false. They are also essentially
dissimilar, in that only ction allows for a suspension of disbelief that lets us ex-
press seemingly true(-ish) propositions about creatures like Sherlock Holmes or
Harry Potter that both speaker and hearer know never existed. Although the
characteristic properties of lies and ction are at least partly semantic in nature,
I’ve shown that there is little to no hope for an insightful analysis within a tra-
ditional truth-conditional semantic framework; we need to turn to pragmatics.
My main aim in this chapter has been to show how Stalnaker’s inuen-
tial pragmasemantic account of assertions as proposals to update the common
ground may be adjusted to incorporate both lies and ction.
For lying, we rst explored the idea of basing the denition of common ground
on a notion of acceptance rather than belief and saw that with this rather minimal
adjustment lies could be treated as genuine assertions.
For ction we saw that more is required, we need to somehow isolate infor-
mation gained by reading the ctional work from information gained through
other types of discourse – but not too strictly, because information must be al-
lowed to ow back and forth between these distinct information repositories.
Much contemporary work in the semantics and philosophy of ction can be un-
derstood as concerned with these information ows.
The general conclusion one may draw from this chapter is that the Stalnaker
model of assertion as common ground updates is a powerful and exible formal
tool that can be used to shed new light on the seemingly idiosyncratic speech
acts involved in lies and ction. And in the other direction, studying lies and
ction leads us to the very boundaries of truth-conditional semantics, and has
prompted important renements of the highly inuential Stalnakerian notion of
common ground.
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